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ABSTRACT
In this paper we have a close look at the Sybil attack and ad-
vances in defending against it, with particular emphasis on
the recent work. We identify three major veins of literature
work to defend against the attack: using trusted certification,
using resources testing, and using social networks. The first
vein of literature considers defending against the attack us-
ing trusted certification, which is done by either centralized
certification or distributed certification using cryptographic
primitives that can replace the centralized certification entity.
The second vein of literature considers defending against the
attack by resources testing, which can by in the form of IP
testing, network coordinates, recurring cost as by requiring
clients to solve puzzles. The third and last vein of literature
is by mitigating the attack combining social networks used
as bootstrapping security and tools from random walk the-
ory that have shown to be effective in defending against the
attack under certain assumptions. Our survey and analyses
of the different schemes in the three veins of literature show
several shortcomings which form several interesting direc-
tions and research questions worthy of investigation.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer Communication Networks]: Gen-
eral – Security and Protection; C.4 [Performance of
Systems]: Design studies.
General Terms
Security.
Keywords
Social networks, Sybil defenses, Survey.
1. INTRODUCTION
The peer-to-peer paradigm of computing has a lot of
advtnages over other conventional paradigms. For ex-
ample, in this paradigm resources such as bandwidth,
memory, and data are made available to other all par-
ticipating users [1]. Broadly, this paradigm includes
∗Also appears as an invited article in Smart Computing Re-
view, vol. 3, no. 6 pp 480-489, 2013.
structured and unstructured systems. Structured over-
lays, such as Kademlia [2] and Chord [3], provide deter-
ministic mechanisms for data and peers discovery while
unstructured overlays, such as Gnutella [4], organize
peers in a random graph and use flooding for peers
and data discovery. Most of the popular peer-to-peer
systems lack “centralized authorities” which makes this
paradigm robust against failure attacks. On the other
hand, the lack of such centralized authority leads to so
many challenging security issues: most security services
necessary for securing networked systems require a type
or another of a centralized authority making these ser-
vices unavailable for the peer-to-peer systems [5]. Even
worse, the fully decentralized and open nature of many
of these systems enable a wide range of security threats
unknown in other distributed systems, including the
Sybil attack [6].
The Sybil attack is well-known in the context of peer-
to-peer, wired, and wireless networks. In its basic form,
a peer representing the attacker generates as many iden-
tities as she can and acts as if she is multiple peers in the
system [6] aiming at disturbing the normal behavior of
the system. The number of identities that an attacker
can generate depends solely on the attacker’s capabil-
ities which are limited by the bandwidth required for
responding to concurrent requests by other peers in the
system, the memory required for storing routing infor-
mation of other peers corresponding to each and every
generated Sybil identity, and computation resources re-
quired for serving concurrent requests without notice-
able delay. With the sharp hardware growth (e.g., in
terms of storage capacity and processing) as well as the
wide spread of broadband Internet with high bandwidth
rates, even attackers running on ‘commodity” hardware
can cause a substantial harm to large systems.
The attack itself is popular and effective in many con-
texts and on my services that are essential in peer-to-
peer systems as well as other generic distributed sys-
tems and paradigms. Such contexts include voting sys-
tems reputation systems, routing, distributed storage,
among others. To illustrate how this attack works in
real systems, imagine a recommender system built over
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a peer-to-peer overlay [7]. In such system, the goal is
to filter information that are likely to be of interest
to users based on others’ recommendations. In that
context an attacker that can act as multiple users by
faking multiple identities (Sybil) can easily out-vote le-
gitimate users’ votes on legitimate objects subject of
voting. This is almost guaranteed given that the num-
ber of legitimate users that normally vote on objects
are always not more than 1% of overall users in the sys-
tem in any realistic recommendation system [7]. Such
an attack becomes appealing to attackers, who are po-
tentially users in the system trying to take advantage
of the system operation given high incentives. For ex-
ample, many online market-places, such as eBay, use
recommendations of customers to determine the repu-
tation of their sellers, people who use their platform
to sell goods, and thus there is an appealing incentive
for such sellers to misbehave to gain higher reputation.
The same scenario arises in many other contexts such
as peer-to-peer file sharing where contents are rated by
users, bandwidth is assigned based on reputation, or
even that reputation is used to determine the goodness
of contents distributed by users. In all of such examples,
incentives exist for users to misbehave and the Sybil at-
tack is proven to be a powerful tool for such attacker to
achieve his goals.
To defend against the attack, there has been sev-
eral attemtps in the form of defenses, or mitigations,
to defend against or limit the impact of the attack.
Such attentps can be classified broadly into two schools
of thoughts: centralized and decentralized (i.e., dis-
tributed) defenses. In centralized defenses [6, 8, 9, 10],
a centralized authority is made responsible for verify-
ing the identity of each and every users in the systems.
While this defense is somewhat effective in defending
against the attack, it makes certain assumptions about
the system some of which are not easy to achieve in
peer-to-peer decentralized systems. First of all, and as
the name and the description of operation tells, such
systems require a centralized authority, that in many
of such systems may not be affordable for both security
and functionality reasons. Also, even if such centralized
authority existed, it requires some credentials related to
the users in the system so as to match these credentials
of the users to their digital identity: in many settings,
obtaining such credentials is very challenging.
On the other hand, decentralized defenses including,
but not limited to, the work in [11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16,
17, 18, 19, 20, 7, 21, 22, 23] do not require such au-
thorities in the system and are well-designed for decen-
tralized peer-to-peer systems. At the core of their op-
eration, such defenses weigh collaboration among users
in the system to admit or reject users, who are poten-
tially attackers. The admision or rejection of users is
based on credentials associated with users, as it is the
case of cryptographic distributed defenses, or network
properties of legitimate honest users, as it is the case of
Sybil defenses using social graph. In either of the so-
lutions, the ultimate goal of the defenses is to simulate
the power of the centralized authority in a decentralized
manner and use such power to detect Sybil and honest
nodes.
Another classification of defenses could be according
to the way such defenses operate. Accordingly, existing
defenses in literature can be classified into defenses us-
ing trusted certification—in which certificates are typ-
ically generated for honest users and verified against
a public key of a trusted authority, incurring cost—in
which users penalized by some cost so that limit them
to their amount of available resources and thus reduce
their misbehavior, and social networks based Sybil de-
fenses.
Such defenses greatly differ in their assumptions, the
type of networks they are applied to, the guarantees
they provide, and the cost they incur. To this end, this,
this paper this paper is dedicated for reviewing, sum-
marizing, comparing, and showing shortcomings of the
existing literature on such defenses. Our method in this
survey is characterized by two aspects: first, we review
each category of each work direction the defenses and
show their merits in defending against the attack in the
claimed context. Second, we summarize the direction
by showing the main shortcomings that lead to open
problems worthy of investigation. This latter part shed
the light on that the technical contribution toward solv-
ing the problem is fragile and that a lot of investigation
is required in order to solve the problem.
To this end, we summarize the organization of the
rest of this paper. In section 2 we introduce preliminar-
ies, including a functional classification of defenses. In
section 3 we review the trusted certification based cat-
egory of defenses while in section 4 we introduces the
category of resources testing followed by social network-
based defenses in section 5. In section 6 followed by
concluding remarks in section 7.
2. MODEL, SETTINGS, AND OBJECTIVES
In this section we elaborate on the problem in hand
and state the attacker model conventionally assumed in
most of Sybil attack studies and defenses. We further
explore the objectives of the attacker and the objective
of the defenses proposed in literature.
2.1 Problem Statement and Model
The problem is stated as the ability of a single user in
the system to act as if she is multiple users with differ-
ent identities. This is problematic for so many applica-
tions since the correctness of such applications depends
on the behavior of peers, their numbers, and willing-
ness to participate collaborate honestly in the system.
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However, such goal cannot be satisfied with Sybil iden-
tities of a single attacker which tries to bias the overall
behavior of the system.
The attacker is formally characterized by the number
of fake identities that she can inject in the system. The
attackers incentive is to maximize this number. The
value and meaning of the number of identities generated
by the attacker and injected into the system depends
on the application itself and varies from an application
to another. For example, to attack a recommendation
system, it is enough to have a matching sum of 1% of
the honest users in the system as fake identities. This is
particularly enough to bias the behavior of the system
and outvote the honest nodes in the system since it
is generally observed that, even for the very popular
objects in this system, only 1% of the honest node vote
for it. This is, by having a single identity more than the
exact number of honest nodes voting on an object in the
system would enable the Sybil attacker to outvote the
honest nodes.
On the other hand, in other systems such as the mix-
ing networks used for communication anonymization
(e.g., Tor network) sufficiently small number of Sybil
identities may present a serious breach to the guaran-
tees in the System. Theoretically, the compromise of
two nodes on a circuit is sufficient to identify the sender
and the receiver of the communication on such mix net-
work [24]. On the other hand, the compromise of suf-
ficient large number of identities in the network would
enable the attacker from monitoring arbitrary number
of circuits. Other applications where the number of
identities itself matters include attacks on file sharing
systems [25], among many others.
To sum up, the attacker’s objective is to maximize the
number of Sybil identities in the overlay though in a few
a small number of Sybil identities suffices to thwart the
application in some cases.
Sybil Defenses
Certification
C/CA D/C T/D
Resources Testing
IP/T R/C S/G
Figure 1: An illustration of the different types defense
for Sybil attack in P2P overlays. C/CA stands for
centralized certificate authority, D/C for decentralized
cryptographic, T/D for trusted devices, IP/T for IP
testing, R/C for recurring cost, and S/G stands for so-
cial graph-based approaches.
2.2 Defense Goals and success metric
The ultimate objective of Sybil defenses is to elimi-
nate the Sybil attack by detecting and isolating Sybil
identities, or peers that generate such identities, from
the overlay. However, this ultimate goals is not always
possible due to that most defenses, except of the cen-
tralized trusted certification based scheme, have false
positive and false negative in their detection mechanism
that might tolerate some Sybil nodes while mistakenly
report other honest nodes as observed in the false pos-
itive and false negative errors. In false negative, Sybil
nodes are reported to be honest nodes. On the other
hand, in false negative honest nodes are reported to
be Sybil nodes. The realistic and practically attainable
goal of defense mechanisms is to minimize false negative
rate as much as possible.
2.3 Deep of Sybil defenses
Beside the broad classification of Sybil defenses into
centralized and decentralized defenses as shown in sec-
tion 1, the defenses we survey in this paper include two
major and broad categories of techniques: trusted certi-
fication and resource testing categories as shown in Fig-
ure 1. Among the schemes in the trusted certification
category, we survey works that use centralized certifica-
tion authority, decentralized cryptographic primitives,
or trusted devices. Among works that use resources
testing, we are particularly interested in works that use
IP testing, cost recurring, and social graphs. While
broad survey is provided for these techniques, detailed
descriptions are provided for cryptographic primitives
and social graph-based techniques.
3. USING TRUSTED CERTIFICATION
The trusted certification approach is arguably the
most popular method in the context of this study since
it has been proven by Douceur [6] for its potential to
eliminate the Sybil attack [26]. In the conventional form
of this approach, a centralized authority (CA) is used
to ensure that the identities assigned to each peer are
unique and legitimate by matching these identities to
pre-assigned credentials. These credentials may include
cryptographic keys, synchronized random strings which
are usually generated by one time password generators
– OTP, or digital certificates issued by the centralized
authority.
While the aforementioned conventional form of cen-
tralized certification authority is well-defined in litera-
ture, there has been some efforts to define a distributed
certification schemes by applying cryptographic primi-
tives suitable for distributed multiparty models which
enable collaboration among supposedly honest peers to
certificate other peers joining the overlay. In this section
we review both approaches. In particular, we report
some of the works in literature on centralized certifica-
tion authorities and provide details for cryptographic
primitives to enable distributed certification systems.
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3.1 Centralized Certification Authority
Centralized trusted certification is potentially the only
method that can eliminate the Sybil attack [6]. There
has been some works on the usage of centralized cer-
tification authorities for credentials generation, assign-
ment, and verification in the context of P2P overlays.
For instance, works that use social graphs which are
explained in section 5 and utilize public key cryptog-
raphy as a building block assume the authenticity of
public keys of users via certificates assigned to users via
a centralized authority in an offline phase [19]. Other
examples of schemes that utilize CCA-based approach
include the works in [8], [9], [6], and [10].
3.2 Cryptographic primitives
Recently, a few works [11, 12, 13, 14, 15] on cryp-
tographic primitives have been proposed. These prim-
itives aim at providing an infrastructure for authenti-
cating peers in order to make the Sybil attack harder
to apply by having only legitimate peers participating
in the overlay. Generally, these works try to exploit
public key infrastructure (PKI) in a distributed man-
ner and using threshold cryptographic ingredients (e.g.,
secret sharing and threshold signatures) in order to en-
sure a collaboration among supposedly honest users to
authenticate peers that join the overlay over its opera-
tion time. Interestingly, the explicitly stated motivation
beyond some of these primitives (e.g., [11, 12, 13, 14])
is that many of the non-cryptographic protocols in li-
etrature assume the existence of a certification system
for legitimate users in the overlay (e.g., SybilGuard and
SybilLimit). Hence, the cryptographic approaches are
designed to ensure successful operation of such proto-
cols. In this section we review two recent cryptographic
approaches – variations of the work in [11] have also
appeared in [12, 13, 14].
3.3 Trusted Devices
Similar to the idea of trusted certification, some works
have suggested the usage of trusted devices or trusted
modules that store certifies, keys, or authentication strings
previously assigned to users by a centralized authori-
ties. Such devices are basically hard to obtain for their
potentially high price and hence can be used for limit-
ing the chances for Sybil attackers. Examples of such
mechanism are proposed in [27] and [28], though the
later work is on wireless sensor networks. In theory,
when the intent of the attacker to obtain as much as
possible of Sybil identities, these defenses might be ef-
fective. However, in cases such as anonymity (Tor for
instance) and recommender systems, given that a fewer
Sybil identities could cause a great harm, these defenses
are obsolete.
4. RESOURCES TESTING
The basic idea beyond the resources testing approach
for defending against Sybil attack is to check if a set
of identities associated with supposedly different users
own enough resources that match the number of identi-
ties. These resources may include computation power,
bandwidth, memory, IP addresses, or even trust cre-
dentials. Though the idea of resources testing is shown
by Douceur for its ineffectiveness [6], some researchers
have argued it to be a minimal defense. This is, the
method is not supposed to entirely eliminate the attack
but to make it harder to apply.
In theory, the majority of schemes in this category of
defenses limit the number of Sybil identities to smaller
number than in the scenario without defenses in place.
However, in practice, even smaller number of Sybil iden-
tities are enough to thwart the availability and security
of many systems. For instance, as mentioned before,
anonymity in anonymous systems such as Tor depends
on two nodes per circuit. Also, it is enough to have
1% of fake identities in online reputation systems in or-
der to out-vote legitimate nodes. In sipte of that, we
review some of the works that use the resources test-
ing approach and show their shortcomings though we
should keep in mind that these schemes are mitigations
(i.e., discourage the attacker) rather than eliminating
the attack.
4.1 IP Testing
Generic testing schemes include the testing of IP ad-
dress of peers trying to determine their location and
match that to their activities. In particular, if an amount
of activities is generated from the same particular geo-
graphical area, it is likely that some of these activities
are due to sybil identities. Beside, the assumption in
such works is that it is not cheap to obtain IP addresses
in different geographical areas. For example, Freedman
et al. [29] introduced Tarzan in which IP addresses of
peers are tested based on their geographical location
in a particular autonomous system. Similar results are
introduced by Cornelli et al in [30] and [30].
The main assumption for these works is that IP ad-
dresses are hard to obtain in geographically wide areas.
However, with recent indicators for the existence of gi-
gantic Botnets [31], compromised hosts under control
by a single administrative entity and reside in differ-
ent autonomous systems, it is quite certain that such
defense mechanisms are useless.
4.2 Recurring Cost
Some works have suggested recurring costs as a method
of defending against the sybil attack. In particular,
computational puzzles [16, 32] and Turing tests (e.g.,
CAPTCHA [33]) are suggested as solutions. However,
for the same reason that IP testing would not work
against an attacker that controls a Botnet, these cost-
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based scheme will not work as well. Furthermore, for
CAPTCHA-like solutions, it has been shown that the
Sybil attacker may post the CAPTCHA tests on sites
controlled by her for users who may solve the test for
getting access to the service provided by the attacker.
Also, some versions of CAPTCHA are vulnerable to
some image processing attack [34].
5. SOCIAL NETWORK-BASED DEFENSES
While most of the previously proposed solutions to
the problem of Sybil attack in distributed systems have
limitations and shortcomings, in a way or another, social-
network based Sybil defenses try to overcome such short-
comings in several elegant ways. First, social network-
based Sybil defenses are mostly decentralized solution
to the problem of Sybil attack, which means that these
designs operate without any centralized authority—a
feature that is highly desirable in necessary in most
distributed systems. This decentralized model of op-
eration is further made easier thanks to the random
walk theory, an ingredient mostly utilized in these de-
fenses. Second, these defenses utilize the trust of social
links among social nodes, making collaboration among
honest nodes possible and easy. Third and last, these
defenses are shown in several studies (citation?) to be
practical and effective in defending against Sybil de-
fenses at low cost, and are further developed as com-
ponents in many services, including distributed hash
tables (DHT), Sybil-resistant voting, and are utilized
in mobile networks routing.
Although they differ greatly in their design details
and operation, all social network-based Sybil defenses
have two common assumptions: an algorithmic prop-
erty, called the fast mixing property, and trust. First,
these defenses are based on the “fast mixing” property
of social graphs (a property that we formally define be-
low). Informally, the fast mixing property of the social
graph implies that the “honest” nodes in such graph are
well-enmeshed and the honest region does not contain
a sparse-cut—a cut that connects two large subsets of
honest nodes with a few social links. For simplicity, the
fast mixing property of social graphs implies that a ran-
dom walk from any arbitrary node in the social graph
would reach very close to the stationary distribution of
the Markov Chain (MC) defined on that graph after a
few walk steps. Such number of steps is suggested to
be 10 to 15 steps in a network of million of nodes.
The second assumption common to this vein of de-
fenses is trust. In particular, all of these defenses as-
sume a good trust value in the underlying social graphs
as indicated, for example, by face-to-face interactions
among the nodes. This particular assumption is neces-
sary in order to reason about the hardness of infiltrating
the social network by arbitrarily many attackers’ social
links. While the operation of the Sybil defense for cor-
rectly identifying “honest” nodes in the social graph is
guaranteed by the fast mixing assumption, and the con-
struction of the corresponding scheme that uses such al-
gorithmic property, the power of identifying Sybil nodes
is only guaranteed assuming that the attacker, or at-
tackers collectivity, control a few links between them-
selves and other honest nodes in the social-graph (such
links are called attack edges).
In the following we review some of the widely cited
works on social network-based Sybil defenses. The reader
is referred to compressive works in this regard, and to
the following related works on the matter.
5.1 SybilGuard
The design of SybilGuard, due to Yu et al. [19, 20],
uses the fast mixing property of trust-possessing so-
cial networks to detect Sybil nodes. Technically, Sybil-
Guard consists of two phases: initialization and online
detection phases. In the initialization phase, each node
constructs its routing table, as random permutation of
its adjacent nodes for pairs of incoming and outgoing
edges. Next, each node initiates a random walk of
length w = O(
√
n logn) and propagates it to its ad-
jacent nodes following the routing tables constructed
using the random permutation. Each node at the path
of the random walk registers the the public of the ran-
dom walk originator, and later acts as a witness of that
node when that node is a suspect. Furthermore, using
the back-traceability of the random walks, each origi-
nator of a random walk receives the list of “witnesses”
(i.e., the nodes which register the originator’s public key
and lie on the path constructed by the random walk of
the originator).
In the online phase a verifier determines whether a
suspect is honest or not as follows. First, the suspect
sends the addresses of the “witnesses” on his random
route to verifier. Accordingly, verifier compares the list
of witness to his list of verifier route. If no intersection
among the two sets (an event that has a very proba-
bility) the verifier aborts and rejects the suspect. Oth-
erwise, the verifier continues by requesting the nodes
on the intersection among the two sets to verify if the
suspect has a public key registered with them. If the
suspect is verified by the intersection nodes, the verifier
accepts the suspect or mark it as a Sybil node otherwise.
5.2 SybilLimit
Unlike SybilGuard in which a single long random
walk is used, SybilLimit suggests the use of several
shorter random walks. Also, unlike SybilGuard where
public keys of verifiers and suspects are registered on
nodes in the social graph, SybilLimit [18] suggests the
registration of such keys on edges in the social graphs.
SybilLimit consists of an initialization phase and an on-
line verification phase. In the initialization phase, each
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node constructs its routing table using the same method
described in SybilGuard and performs r = O(
√
n) ran-
dom walks each of length w = O(log n) where O(log n)
is the mixing time of the social graph—which is used as
10 to 15 in a million of nodes social graph, and is theo-
retically assumed to be sufficient to sample nodes from
a distribution that is very close to the statistical distri-
bution. Unlike SybilGuard where all nodes on the path
of the random route are used for registering the public
key of the originator of the random walk, the last edge
in each walk among the r random walks is used for reg-
istering the public key of that originator node (each of
such edges is called tail). In particular, the public key of
the originator of the walk is registered at the last node in
the walk under the last edge through which the random
walk has arrived. Also using the back-tracebility prop-
erty of the random routes, the witnesses which register
the the public key of the originator node (which could
be either a suspect or a verifier) return their identities
to that node. The same process is performed by every
node in the social graph and sets of witnesses (or verifi-
cation nodes) are collected by each node that originates
the random walks of registration.
In the online phase, also same as SybilGuard, the sus-
pect sends the identifiers and addresses of the witnesses
to the verifier node which compares the witnesses in
the suspect’s list trying to find a collision. If a collision
happens in the two sets at the verifier side, the verifier
asks the witness with common identity in both sets to
verify the identity of the suspect and decides whether
to accept or reject the suspect based on the outcome
of this process. If no intersection happens between the
two sets (which has a very small probably) the verifier
aborts and rejects the suspect, by labeling her as an
attacker.
The main ingredients used for reasoning about the
provable guarantees of the SybilLimit are same as those
in SybilGuard. In particular, given that the random
walk length w is the mixing time of the social graph, the
last node selected in such random walk is according to
the stationary distribution. Furthermore, the last edge
in the random walk is selected “almost” uniformly at
random from the edges in the social graph. Also, given
that r = O(
√
n), an intersection between the sampled
edges of the verifier and the suspect exists with an over-
whemling probability, if the hidden constanct r0 (where
r = r0
√
n) is choosen correctly. The authors refer to
this condition as the “intersection” condition, which is
used for ensuring a high probability for intersection of
random walks by nodes in the honest region. As in
SybilGuard, assuming g attacker edges, the attacker is
allowed to register his public keys of Sybil identities
on at most gwr = O(g
√
n logn) tails (called tainted
tails). In such case, each attached edge introduces ad-
ditional O(log n) Sybil identities (assuming that the at-
tacker uses the optimal attack strategy by registering
different public keys of different Sybil identities at each
possible tainted tail).
SybilLimit also greatly depends on w for its secu-
rity. Since there is no mechanism for estimating the ex-
act value of the parameter, undersetimating or overesti-
mating such parameter are both problematic as shown
above. SybilLimit also provides a “benchmarking tech-
nique” for estimating this parameter, which also does
not provide any provable guarantee on the quality of
the estimation of the parameters. Finally, SybilLimit
can provide guarantees on the number of Sybil identi-
ties introduced per attack edge as long as g = o( n
logn
).
Notice that both SybilGuard and SybilLimit do not re-
quire any global knowledge of the social network they
operate on, and can be implemented in a fully decen-
tralized manner.
5.3 SybilInfer
SybilInfer uses a probabilistic model defined over ran-
dom walks (called traces) in order to infer the the extent
to which a set of nodes X , which generated such traces,
is honest. The basic assumption in SybilInfer is that
each node has a global view and knowledge of the so-
cial network, the network is fast mixing, and the node
that initiates SybilInfer is a honest node. Techically,
SybilInfer tries to ultimately label the different nodes
in the graph into honest or Sybil nodes. In SybilInfer,
each node, in a network of n nodes performs s walks,
hence the overall number of walks in the universal trace
is s × n. Each trace among these traces consists of
the first node (the initiator of the random walk) and
the last node in the random walk (i.e., tail). Unlike
the uniform (over node degree) transition probability
used ins SybilGuard and SybilLimit, SybilInfer defines
the transition matrix uniform over nodes, thus penal-
izing nodes with higher degree. The ultimate goal of
the operation of SybilInfer is compute the probability
P (X = Honest|T ); this is, computing the probability
that a set of nodes X being honest given the traces T .
This probability is computed using Bayes theorem.
SybilInfer also uses non-trivial techniques for sam-
pling the honest configuration that is used initially for
determining the honesty of a set of nodes from their
traces. This sampling is performed using the Metropolis-
Hasting algorithm by initially considering a set X0 and
modifying the set once at a time by either removing or
adding nodes to the set: at each time, and with proba-
bility Padd a new node x from X¯0 is added toX0 to make
X ′ = X0 ∪ x or a node in X0 is removed with probabil-
ity premove. The process is performed for n logn rounds
in order to obtain a good sample independent of X0.
5.4 SumUp
Unlike SybilGuard and SybilLimit which are generic
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to the problem of node admission, and decentralized in
the sense that they do not require a single node to carry
global information about the social graph, and Sybil-
Infer which is applied for inferring honesty of nodes,
SumUp [35] tries to tackle the Sybil attack in the con-
text of vote aggregation. In this context, a node—called
the vote collector—wishes to collect votes in a Sybil re-
sistant manner from other nodes in the network. This
is, among a given number of votes on an object, the
vote collector wishes to increase the fraction of votes
accepted for honest nodes, reduce the accepted votes
casted by the attacker through his attack edge and iden-
tify attackers once they misbehave repeatedly. At the
core of SumUp, a link capacity assignment mechanism
is used for adaptively assigning capacities to links in
the trust-possessing social graph and for restricting the
amount of votes propagated to the vote collector from
the voters side. The adaptive vote flow mechanism of
SumUp uses two observations of the conventional on-
line voting systems: a few users in the system vote on
a single object and that—if such voting system is im-
plemented on top of a social graph—the congestion is
only at links close to the vote collector. Accordingly,
SumUp suggests to distribute a number of tickets on
the different links in the social graph based on their
distance (according to some levels computed using the
breadth-first search algorithm) from the vote collector.
One obvious draw of the technique is its high com-
putational requirements: the running time of a typical
algorithm such as the Ford-fulkerson algorithm would
require an order of the number of edges of operations
for collecting the vote of a single voter. The authors
further suggest a heuristic that uses only an order of
the graph diameter number of steps, where each node
greedily selects a node at the higher level through which
it is connected using a non-zero capacity and propagate
the vote until it reaches the vote collector. At any time
step, given that the greedy step may not result in a
non-zero capacity, each node is allowed to explore other
nodes for paths at the same or lower level.
5.5 GateKeeper
GateKeeper [21] borrows tools from both of SumUp
and SybilLimit for efficient operation. In particular, it
tries to improve the performance of SybilLimit by incor-
porating the ticket distribution component of SumUp.
Unlike in SumUp where nodes are admitted through a
non-zero path from the voter to the collector, as ex-
plained earlier, GateKeeper only considers the “ticket
distribution” phase of SumUp where tickets are used for
admitting nodes by an admission controller. Such tick-
ets are propagated from the controller to all nodes in
the same way as in SumUp. However, in order to limit
the attacker’s chances of receiving more tickets and re-
duce his overall advantage, a controller in GateKeeper
randomly selectsm different random nodes; called “van-
tage nodes”, where a suspect node is admitted if and
only if it receives fadmitm tickets (where fadmit is the
fraction of randomly selected vantage points; 0.2 is used
in GateKeeper) from different vantage points. There-
fore, a node is admitted if it is admitted by such frac-
tion of he vantage points. To combat double spending,
GateKeeper suggests the use of cryptographic signature
chains of the paths through which the tickets are spent
(propagated to the controller).
5.6 Other Social Network-based DHTs
SPROUT [36] is another DHT routing protocol that
uses social links of trust-possessing social graphs to route
information to users operating on top of the social net-
works. SPROUT in fact builds on top of Chord [3] and
adds additional links (routing table entries) in Chord to
other users in the social network of any given node that
are online at any time. By doing so, SPROUT claims
to improve reliability and distribution of load of Chord
itself.
Whanau was originally presented in [23], where the
work in [22] included further analysis and proof of per-
formance and security as well as implementation and
demonstration of the end-to-end guarantees. .
In [1], the authors use bootstrap graphs—trees that
characterize introduction relationships in the DHT, in
order to defend against the Sybil attack. By modifying
the operation of Chord, the DHT of interest, in a way
that each node returns address of all nodes that it knows
of (including introduction points), the authors devise
several strategies used to reduce the impact of Sybil at-
tack. Unlike the original Chord which uses the closeness
over the Chord as a metric for routing (query), the so-
lution considers several strategies for routing, including
diversity, mixed, and zig-zag. The authors show exper-
imentally that such strategies can be used to more ef-
ficiently perform Sybil-resistant DHT lookups with less
number of queries than that required by the plain Chord
design, when operating under a Sybil attack. The de-
sign of MobID [37] is a social-network based Sybil de-
fense that claims to provide a robust defense for mo-
bile environments while existing defenses have largely
been designed for peer-to-peer networks and are based
on the random walk theory. Furthermore, MobID uses
the betweenness, a graph-theoretic measure in the social
graph, for determining the goodness of nodes in order
to defend against the Sybil attacks. The work, however,
does not seem to provide any provable guarantees. A
comparison between the various schemes, and others in
the literature are in Table 1 and Table 2.
5.7 Recent analyses and supplementary work
Our work in [38] initiated the study of the mixing
time as the basic assumption used in Sybil defenses and
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Table 1: A comparison between the major schemes that use social graphs in terms of upper bounds on performance.
In all of these bounds, O(log n) is the mixing time of the social graph. The hidden constant here is very small;
typically, rn = 0.005n. Model tunable parameters
Scheme Maximum g Accepts w # walks
SybilGuard O(
√
n/ logn)1 O(
√
n logn) O(
√
n logn) 1
SybilLimit O(n/ logn) O(log n) O(log n) O(
√
m)
SybilInfer — — O(log n) c3
SumUp O(n)2 O(1) — —
Gatekeepr O(n/ logn) O(log k) O(log n) c3
Whanau O(n/ logn) O(log n) O(log n) O(
√
cn logn)
MobID — — — —
Table 2: A comparison between the major schemes that use social graphs in terms of their model, assumptions, and
application.
Scheme Model Graph assumptions Application
SybilGuard Decentralized Fast mixing/trust possessing Generic
SybilLimit Decentralized Fast mixing trust possessing Generic
SybilInfer Centralized Fast mixing/trust possessing Generic
SumUp Centralized Fast mixing/trust possessing Voting
Gatekeepr Decentralized Balanced expander (random) Admission
Whanau Decentralized Fast mixing trust possessing DHT
MobID Decentralized High betweenness honest nodes Mobile
showed negative results on its quality in many social
networks. Viswanath et al. conducted an experimen-
tal analysis of sybil defenses based on social networks
in [39]. Their study aimed at comparing different de-
fenses (namely, SybilGuard [20], SybilLimit [18], Sybil-
Infer [40], and SumUp [35]) independent of the data
sets being used, by decomposing these defenses to their
cores. They show that the different Sybil defenses work
by ranking different nodes based on how well-connected
are these nodes to a trusted node (the verifier). Also,
they show that the different Sybil defenses are sensitive
to community structure in social networks and commu-
nity detection algorithms can be used to replace the
random walk based Sybil defenses. We brought a simi-
lar insight in [41] by showing that the core structure of
social graphs is related to the mixing time, and utilized
those findings in improving the mixing time of poorly-
mixing ones in [42]. We studied how trust affects the
performance of Sybil defenses in [43].
6. RELATED WORKS
Related to our work, Levine et al [26] proposed a
broad survey on solutions for sybil attack in general
settings including P2P overlays. Unlike our work, they
emphasized on classifying the literature works broadly
rather than defining merits and shortcomings of each
class of works. Our survey, however, has greatly bene-
fited form their classification though the set of schemes
reviewed in our survey is greatly different. In particular,
the main technical contents of our survey review works
that are published after the publication of the survey in
[26]. Related to social network-based defenses, Yu has
presented an intriguing tutorial and a survey in [44].
7. CONCLUSION
The sybil attack is very powerful when applied to
P2P overlays and their countermeasures are harder than
in other networking settings because of the P2P over-
lays nature: centralized authorities necessary for secu-
rity enforcement are discouraged and sometimes absent
from P2P overlays designs. In this article, we review the
literature of different methods used to defend against
the Sybil attack in P2P overlays. We show the different
defenses’ assumptions, features, and shortcomings and
compare them to each other.
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